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Abstract
This paper utilizes an analytical distinction between three
modes of social belonging to explain the ambiguous reset-
tlement experiences of refugees granted a temporary pro-
tection visa (TPV) in Australia. Findings from two
qualitative studies indicate that the dominance of a public
discourse that depicts asylum seekers as “illegals” inhibits
their sense of belonging at the national level. Yet belong-
ing has been facilitated locally through relational net-
works within communities and the establishment of
associations based on cultural or legal categories. Impor-
tantly, these successes have provided a basis from which to
contest the continued lack of recognition faced by TPV
refugees within a nationalistic public discourse.
Résumé
Cet article fait appel à une différence analytique entre
trois modes d’appartenance sociale pour expliquer l’expé-
rience ambiguë de la réinstallation vécue par les réfugiés
qui obtiennent un TPV (« visa de protection tempo-
raire ») en Australie. Les conclusions de deux études qua-
litatives indiquent que la dominance d’un discours
publique représentant les demandeurs d’asile comme des
« clandestins », bloque leur sens d’appartenance au ni-
veau national. Au niveau local cependant, l’apparte-
nance a été facilitée à travers des réseaux de relations à
l’intérieur des communautés et l’établissement d’associa-
tions basées sur les catégories culturelles ou légales. Ce
qui importe encore plus c’est que ces succès ont fourni
une base à partir de laquelle il est maintenant possible de
contester le manque de reconnaissance confrontant les ré-
fugiés TPV dans l’environnement crée par un discours
publique nationaliste.
Introduction
The introduction of the  temporary protection  visa(TPV) in Australia has had important repercussionsfor the resettlement experiences and citizenship
status of refugees. Having already spent considerable time
in transit, refugees issued a TPV are forced into a continued
state of limbo by the policy of mandatory detention. Once
finally released into the Australian community, their visa
status provides few settlement services and even fewer rights.
Despite these hurdles, many such refugees have developed a
sense of belonging at the local level and, according to the
goals of many refugee resettlement policies, might be con-
sidered “integrated.” This sense of belonging is, however,
continually contested at the level of public discourse where
political rhetoric justifies the temporary protection offered
to such refugees by representing them as “illegals” or “queue
jumpers.” In making sense of this ambiguous outcome, the
paper builds on growing awareness that we need to under-
stand social integration and belonging as far more complex
and multi-faceted than resettlement policies and programs
typically acknowledge. This is particularly the case for “un-
authorized” asylum seekers who are subject to greater stig-
matization  than refugees accepted through conventional
offshore programs.
To this end, the first section of the paper draws upon
Calhoun’s distinction between relational networks, cultural
or legal categories, and discursive publics as modes of social
belonging that represent citizenship.1 Doing so allows us to
deconstruct traditional understandings of belonging and
integration in a way that provides an explanation for the
ambiguous resettlement experiences of refugees granted a
TPV and living in the state of Victoria, Australia. The
second section of the paper maps out the political context
in which temporary protection policies were introduced in
Australia, as well as the specific entitlements and restric-
tions that accompany the TPV. This draws attention to a
dominant public discourse, which contests the ability and
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right of refugees on TPVs to belong. The third and final
section of the paper explores the experiences of refugees on
TPVs, as documented in two qualitative research studies
undertaken by the authors. In this discussion, emphasis is
placed on both the continuing effects such a negative public
discourse has had upon refugees on TPVs and the successes
achieved by a Melbourne community-based organization
in facilitating a sense of belonging amongst refugees on
TPVs at the local level. Consequently, this sense of belong-
ing and partial security has provided the support needed to
challenge the continued lack of recognition confronting
refugees due to dominance of a public discourse that de-
monizes and devalues them.
Extending the Debate around Integration and
Belonging
The notion  of refugee integration is not easily defined,
although this term usually refers to a long-term process that
results in refugees being able to participate in all aspects of
the host society where they now live, without having to give
up their own cultural identity.2 The refugee studies litera-
ture demonstrates that the integration process is one com-
plicated by numerous variables. A distinction is commonly
made, for example, between economic and cultural or so-
cial aspects of integration. Typical refugee programs, not
surprisingly, tend to concentrate their often meagre re-
sources on the former because the functional issues of hous-
ing, employment, and education are regarded as the fastest
means for integrating refugees within the community.3
There is, however, widespread recognition within the
literature that successful resettlement also requires atten-
tion to be paid to the cultural and social needs of refugees,
which are multiple and complex. Berry, Kim, and Boski for
example, have identified that cultural adaptation involves
physical, biological, cultural, and social change within refu-
gee individuals,4 while Liev has developed an integrated
model indicating that refugees adapting to a host society
experience stress at the individual, familial, group, or or-
ganizational levels.5 Nevertheless, Bihi highlights that many
models of refugee integration focus predominantly on psy-
chological interpretations of displacement.6 This can lead
to the misunderstanding that refugees are unable to adjust
because of previous suffering, when policy and program
failure may be a major contributor to their ill- adjustment.
Korac’s comparative research in the Netherlands and
Italy provides compelling evidence that the official resettle-
ment policies adopted by different countries have a signifi-
cant  impact on integration,  not only in  relation to  the
functional concerns of housing, employment, and educa-
tion, but also in regard to the social participation of refugees
in wider society, which influences their sense of identity,
belonging, recognition, and self-respect.7 She documents
how refugees in the Netherlands were unable to overcome
a sense of detachment from their host society that devel-
oped during prolonged stays in asylum centres, despite
receiving relatively high degrees of formal assistance with
employment and housing. They were thus largely unsuc-
cessful in establishing closer ties with Dutch citizens. In
contrast, refugees in Italy received minimal assistance
through self-help systems established within refugee and
migrant networks. As a result, they became not only more
self-sufficient, but also better integrated into Italian society.
Although experiencing considerable difficulties with hous-
ing and work in their initial phase of resettlement, in addi-
tion to remaining clustered in predominantly low-paying
jobs, most of the refugees in Italy felt a greater sense of
belonging than those living in the Netherlands.
These ambivalent results led Korac to conclude that
spontaneous and individualized encounters between refu-
gees and host society members help avoid negative, hierar-
chical perceptions of the “other” and encourage a mutual
process of learning and shifting from which both groups
can gain.8 Yet, refugee assistance programs often treat refu-
gees as having “immature social identities” in need of cul-
tural and social re-education. This has resulted in language
acquisition and cultural adaptation being used as the key
indicators when assessing levels of integration. Korac ar-
gues that strategies for building the kind of “bridging social
capital” which provides refugees with a sense of rootedness
and wider belonging are more useful than those that regard
integration as one-way assisted process. This is because the
latter treats refugees as policy objects, rather than as a vital
resource in the integration process.
These findings go some way to explaining the experi-
ences of refugees on TPVs living in Australia. In exploring
the meaning of this ambivalent space, we have found Cal-
houn’s discussion of the different modes of social belonging
that represent citizenship useful in extending the debate
around issues of social or societal integration.9 Calhoun
argues that there has been a lack of attention paid to dis-
tinctions between three different modes of social belonging.
First, belonging exists as the level of “communities,” which
consist of relatively small groups that are primarily consti-
tuted through informal, directly interpersonal relation-
ships rather than formal political-legal institutions.
“Categories,” on the other hand, are commonly comprised
of large numbers of people who are not knit by the dense
interpersonal relationships that constitute communities,
but develop a sense of belonging around their shared cul-
ture or legal status. Calhoun suggests that the rhetorics of
culture and community are problematic ones by which to
grasp political rights. He thus argues that we need to recog-
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nize “publics” as a third distinctive mode of social belong-
ing. These are quasi-groups constituted by mutual engage-
ment in discourse aimed at determining the nature of social
institutions, including nation-states. Here belonging is not
based on dense webs of common understandings or shared,
taken-for-granted social relations but, as Calhoun has
noted elsewhere, on “socially sustained discourses about
who it is possible or appropriate or valuable to be.”10 This
can lead to problems of recognition for those who do not
match dominant discourses regarding valued social iden-
tities.
Calhoun’s intention in making these distinctions is to
highlight theoretical weaknesses in current approaches to
citizenship,  particularly the  way  in  which  discourses  of
political community are deeply shaped by nationalism. He
argues that this has resulted in our using terms like “com-
munity” as though there is no problem in making them
refer to local, face-to-face networks at the same time as
whole nations conceived of categories of culturally similar
persons. Yet:
Membership in a society is an issue of social solidarity and
cultural identity as well as legally constructed state citizenship.
This is all the more important to recognize in an era shaped by
new cultural diversities and new challenges to the abilities of
states to maintain sharp and socially effective borders.11
We believe that the distinction between belonging in
terms of relational networks, cultural or legal categories,
and discursive publics  is  extremely valuable  for  under-
standing the rather ambiguous resettlement process expe-
rienced by refugees on TPVs in Australia. In indicating both
the catalysts for, and obstacles to, their sense of belonging,
we demonstrate the utility of making analytical distinctions
between modes of social belonging when planning, imple-
menting, and assessing policy and programs aimed at en-
hancing refugee integration. In turn, we hope to inform
what Castles calls a sociology of forced migration that
understands “exile, displacement and belonging” as a part
of social process in which human agency and social net-
works play a major role, if in the context of global social
transformation.12
Public Discourses around Temporary Protection
Public discourse is an area of debate dependent on the
competing articulation of differences of ideas, opinions,
and identities. In this way, it is also the site of explicit and
implicit attempts at persuasion.13 Castles notes that asylum
and other forms of forced migration have become major
themes of political debate in many countries as the numbers
of people displaced each year has grown through the
1990s.14 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the
economic uncertainty and security concerns that have pro-
duced this result, but it is clear that refugees and asylum
seekers have been regarded as physically embodying an
external threat to jobs, living standards, welfare, and the
dominance of the nation-state as the focus of social belong-
ing. The issue of forced migration has, as a consequence,
become increasingly marked by heated public debates and
competition between the political parties as to who is the
toughest on “illegals.”
Given the enormous political and financial resources
that can be used to support them, the highly politicized
discourses promoted by governments frequently dominate
the public  domain.  This has certainly been  the  case  in
Australia, where political rhetoric around the issue of asy-
lum and temporary protection has attempted to influence
public opinion regarding the Australian Government’s im-
migration and border protection policies by playing on
existing public fears and insecurities. Australia has histori-
cally enjoyed a positive international reputation for its
interpretation of the 1951 United Nations Convention re-
lating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol. Cer-
tainly, an estimated 650,000 refugees have been accepted as
permanent residents since 1945 and 12,000 places are cur-
rently set aside each year for the humanitarian component
of its permanent immigration program.15 Yet, Australia has
long demonstrated a preoccupation with controlling its
borders to prevent entry of others. The most obvious ex-
ample is the “White Australia” sentiment that dominated
policy from 1901 to the early 1970s.16
Although such explicitly racist policy has officially been
abandoned, Australia continues to be a nation that demon-
strates hostility towards its immigrant foundations. The
most recent manifestations of such hostility are the contro-
versial policies on mandatory detention, border protection,
and temporary protection. These have established a distinc-
tion between “good” refugees and “bad” refugees. The
former are selected overseas, usually after referral from the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and en-
ter Australia with a visa that entitles them to permanent
residency (and to apply for citizenship after the prescribed
waiting period). “Bad” refugees, on the other hand, are
asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat without
“authorization”; that is, a visa and/or a valid passport.
This distinction was established in 1989 when the Keat-
ing Labor government began automatically detaining un-
authorized arrivals, a practice formalized by the Migration
Amendment Act 1992.17 However, the temporary protec-
tion visa introduced by the Howard Liberal-National gov-
ernment in October 1999 further entrenched this division
between “good” and “bad” refugees. It also marked a shift
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towards dealing with asylum seekers in terms of border
protection policy, rather than human rights protection un-
der the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Unauthorized
arrivals found to be refugees are now granted TPVs for a
period of three years (in some cases, five years) instead of
the permanent protection visas (PPVs) formerly offered.
Prior to September 2001, refugees with TPVs due to
expire could apply for a PPV, which would grant them
Australian residency status. Since that date, unauthorized
arrivals assessed as meeting the refugee classification are no
longer able to seek a PPV if, since leaving their home
country, they resided for at least seven days in a country
where they could have sought and obtained effective pro-
tection. According to present policy, refugees granted TPVs
since 2001 may consequently have the right to seek another
TPV, but will never be able to seek permanent protection
in Australia.18
Australia’s TPV regime was founded on real concerns
about the increasing misuse of Australia’s onshore protec-
tion arrangements by organized people smugglers and owes
its continuing existence to the political belief that it discour-
ages the illegal entry of asylum seekers into Australia.19 Its
introduction coincided with and has manipulated an exist-
ing public discourse representing asylum seekers as queue
jumpers who offend the Australian sense of “fair play.”
With the weight of the Australian Government behind it,
this discourse has overwhelmed counter-stories indicating
that the selection of refugees for resettlement is more like a
lottery than an orderly queue process20 and that making a
formal application is neither practical nor possible for most
refugees.21 This was certainly the case for most of the 8,860
refugees who had been granted a TPV in Australia by
October 2003. For instance, 3,658 were from Afghanistan
and 4,254 from Iraq, both troubled nations where formal
refugee applications were impossible to make.22
Importantly, the majority of refugees on TPVs are also
single males or married men who left their families at home
or in another country and are practicing Muslims. These
ethnic, gender, and religious characteristics have worked
against refugees on TPVs as together they have been por-
trayed as representing a “threat” to Australia’s social cohe-
sion. Marr and Wilkinson conclude that the Australian
Government’s border protection policy combines a crude
racism with genuine concern for the security of the country
that is best described as “race wrapped in the flag.”23 This
racism builds on existing understandings of “Australian
Muslims” and “mainstream Australians,” which Nebhan
suggests are positioned along different sides of an imagi-
nary border that separates two seemingly totalized “cul-
tures.”24 The events of 11 September 2001 did nothing to
either  discourage such beliefs  or  improve the image of
refugees, who have been branded as a sinister transnational
threat to national security even though none of the Septem-
ber 11 terrorists were actually refugees or asylum seekers.25
Indeed, this  attack on the United States  appeared to
support the Australian Government’s depiction of refugees
seeking asylum as unable to leave conflict at home behind,
even when opposition to what the Prime Minister, John
Howard, calls “evil and terrorism” was a key factor in their
departure.26 The Minister for Defence, Peter Reith, explic-
itly suggested that terrorists might be lurking amongst
“boat people.”27 Meanwhile, the Minister for Immigration,
Phillip Ruddock, characterized asylum seekers arriving by
boat as “those who have the money, those who are prepared
to break the law, those who are prepared to deal with people
smugglers and criminals.”28 The bogus “children over-
board” incident29 nonetheless provides the most striking
demonstration of the way in which “bad” refugees have
been represented as lacking the required (yet ill-defined)
values Howard’s government wishes to muster and affirm.
Howard, in referring to the alleged child-throwers, stated:
“I don’t want people like that in Australia. Genuine refugees
don’t do that … They hang onto their children.”30
Political concern about national security and integrity
has fuelled a public discourse which casts refugees as a
“deviant” problem that should be expelled from Australia’s
national borders. This category of “refugee” is constructed
as being incapable of possessing the qualities a person must
have in order to be considered a “real” citizen.31 This has
had repercussions not only for the recognition of asylum
seekers as refugees but also for the resettlement of those
deemed to meet these criteria. While refugees granted a
PPV are able to begin their resettlement process immedi-
ately and have access to a variety of resettlement programs
and services, those arriving without official documents are
sent to one of several detention centres around the country.
Mandatory detention may have helped alleviate growing
social and political pressures caused by Australia’s fear of
being “swamped” by newcomers.32 But there is evidence to
suggest that the poor conditions and prison-like nature of
detention in Australia have detrimental effects upon the
physical, social, and psychological health of refugees on
TPVs.33 In addition, although many refugees on TPVs have
been in Australia for up to five years, their resettlement has
been effectively delayed from anywhere between a few
months to a few years.
After being released from detention, refugees on TPVs
continue to be treated as “second-class citizens” in terms of
access to settlement services. The accompanying table pro-
vides a snapshot of the different entitlements that refugees
on TPVs are able to access in comparison to refugees
granted a permanent protection visa.34
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There are literally thousands of such “temporary citi-
zens” whose lives are curtailed by their limited access to
basic rights and services, as well as the more fundamental
personal freedoms detailed above. The next section sug-
gests, however, that many refugees on TPVs are beginning
to integrate and belong, despite the continuing uncertainty,
shame, and lack of control that result from the negative
discursive representations that dominate the public arena.
Beginning to Belong: Refugees on Temporary
Protection Visas in Victoria
An analytical distinction between modes of belonging at the
levels of community, cultural or legal categories, and dis-
cursive publics has been established to draw attention to the
complexity of social integration. Findings from two quali-
tative research studies offer evidence that belonging con-
sists of sets of overlapping and interconnected processes
that take place differently in various sub-sectors and
spheres of receiving societies and have various outcomes.35
First, an action research project conducted in 2002–2003
highlights the continuing and negative impact that the
dominant public discourse surrounding the TPV regime
has had on refugees.36 Second, a further 2003 interview
study highlights the way in which an innovative community
organization has assisted refugees on TPVs to develop a
sense of belonging at the community and category levels.37
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Entitlements Associated with Temporary Compared to Permanent Protection Visas
Entitlement
Permanent Protection Visa
Arrived onshore without a visa
&/or valid passport
Temporary Protection Visa
Selected through offshore refugee program
Residency status Permanent, right to apply for Australian
citizenship.
Temporary (usually 3 years), no right to permanent protection
(and thus Australian citizenship) if spent 7 days or more in a
country where effective protection could have been sought and
obtained (since Sept 2001).
Travel Same ability to leave the country and
return as other permanent residents.
Travel, even if permitted, voids any protection submission.
Family Reunion Able to bring immediate family
members.
No family reunion rights, even for spouse and children.
Settlement Support Access to full federally funded settlement
services, including Migrant Resource
Centres, interpreter service and
integration assistance.
Not eligible for most federally funded services, except for
health screening and referral.
Housing Assistance with public housing included
within settlement services.
Not entitled to on-arrival accommodation. Limited access to
public housing.
Work rights Permission to work. Permission to work but job search assistance severely restricted.
Income Support Immediate access to the full range of
federal social security benefits.
Access only to Special Benefit for which criteria apply.
Education Same access to education as other
permanent residents.
Access to primary, secondary and vocational education subject
to state policy (access granted in Victoria). Effective exclusion
from tertiary study due to imposition of international student
fees.
English classes Eligible for 510 hours of federally funded
English language training.
Not eligible for federally funded English language programs or
translating and interpreting services, although since Jan 2003
Special Benefit recipients have some access to basic Language,
Literacy and Numeracy Programs.
Medical Benefits Same eligibility for Medicare and Health
Care Card as other permanent residents.
Eligible for Medicare and Health Care Cards.
The above table is adapted from Brotherhood of St Lawrence, “Seeking Asylum: Living with Fear, Uncertainty and Exclusion,”
Changing Pressures Bulletin 11 (November 2002)
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This in turn has provided a basis for such refugees to contest
the public discourse that both devalues and demonizes them.
Devalued and Demonized: The Effects of a Public
Discourse
Without a doubt, the highly politicized public discourse
dominating debate around the TPV regime has negatively
impacted upon the resettlement of refugees. The material
hardships faced by refugees on TPVs were an important
theme in the first research study, which involved in-depth
interviews with fifty-one refugees on TPVs and fifteen serv-
ice providers living in Melbourne or regional centres of
Victoria. The majority of the TPV refugees survived on very
limited incomes, lived in insecure housing, had ongoing
health problems, and were restricted in their access to
educational opportunities. These issues, although common
to other refugees, were discovered to be profoundly con-
nected with their legal and rhetorical positioning in the
dominant public discourse.
Labour market participation, for example, was inhibited
by the temporary nature of the protection offered by the
TPV. Refugees told of direct discrimination by employers,
who frequently mistook the TPV to be a form of tourist visa
(which does not allow employment) or were wary of em-
ploying someone granted only temporary status. A partici-
pant in a regional group interview proclaimed: “I can’t get
a job around here. They look at my visa and they say no
straightaway. The boss says no!” Others spoke of the indi-
rect effects of holding a TPV. These included the inability
to gain proficiency in English (due  to federally  funded
English-as-a-second-language (ESL) providers being re-
stricted from enrolling refugees on TPVs) and to receive
assistance in gaining domestic work experience or to have
their qualifications recognized (due to limited access to Job
Network services).
These obstacles, established by federal government pol-
icy, disguised the desire of many TPV holders to participate
in and contribute to society to a degree far greater than their
limited visa status allows. For example, an Iraqi expressed
his wish: “Just to be able to do something, to work, to
contribute to this society, to feel that I’m doing something
and not on Special Benefit.” Yet, the poverty traps and work
disincentives associated with the Special Benefit, a discre-
tionary payment for those in severe financial need due to
circumstances outside their control, resulted in reported
Centrelink debts for about a quarter of the fifty-one refu-
gees interviewed. This raises fundamental policy questions
about whether the Special Benefit is the right payment for
people who are living in Australia for at least three years and
who are both keen to work and highly motivated to gain
greater financial independence.
Given the many practical obstacles faced by refugees on
TPVs, it is telling that refugee participants considered their
most significant barrier to resettlement to be the ongoing
psychological uncertainty and distress caused by the TPV and
mandatory detention regimes. The participants indicated
that the limited freedom and sense of isolation associated
with the legal conditions of their visa far outweighed material
concerns about  access  to  resettlement services. A  female
refugee noted in a focus group:
But all of these things result from the very important matter,
which is really affecting the situation of TPV holders, the psy-
chology of the situation, resulting from the temporary living
situation. Okay, yeah, all of these other things … the services
that we are not eligible for, produce a very bad environment, a
psychological environment. So this is the thing that we have to
focus on, which is why we are always talking about the tempo-
rary protection visa.
All of the refugees interviewed made a direct connection
between their temporary visa status and their feelings of
stress, anxiety, hopelessness, and uncertainty: “I just think
about it and I feel depressed, you know, a lot of pressure,
thinking about everything.” The deep uncertainty associated
with the TPV severely restricts the capacity of refugees to
recover from a traumatic past, as well as to dream and hope
for a better future. As a result, many described the TPV as a
“secondary form of punishment,” similar to living like “an
island cut off from the mainland.” While the emotional,
spiritual, and mental resilience among the refugee research
participants was inspiring, the reality of living with a TPV on
a day-to-day basis represented the final straw. They described
the experience of shrinking hope:
Once we got to Australia we thought we would be safe and
protected … and then we came to this … and then we got this
temporary protection visa, we thought we were slowly dying
again because we started a new form of suffering.
In particular, they could not make sense of how they had
been recognized as genuine refugees, yet still had to live
with such uncertainty, as an Iraqi participant suggested:
First of all we are discriminated as a group of people who are
not equal to the others [refugees granted PPVs], and at the same
time, we have the same condition as the others – they got refugee
status and a whole right.
This situation caused some to holddeepfearsabout forcibly
being deported to the country they have fled: “Three years,
and what’s next, deportation, back to detention centres, or
back to our country to the serious death or jail.”
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Not surprisingly, the pivotal hope for research partici-
pants centred  on  attaining permanent  residency, which
they believed would give them the psychological security
and material stability needed to plan for a future free from
political persecution, torture, and trauma. They indicated
that permanent protection would enable refugees on TPVs
to regain a sense of control over their own lives, defined in
terms of autonomy and agency in regard to securing resi-
dency, family reunion, employment, health, education, and
participation in cultural and public activities. Yet, the fu-
ture of the refugees as permanent residents and everything
that flows from this state of ontological and legal security is
currently subject to an external decision of a governmental
authority. The powerlessness felt by TPV holders as a result
has been exacerbated by the way in which expiring TPVs
have been replaced by an automatically issued special three-
year Class XC visa until immigration officials redetermine
the refugee status of each visa holder. More than 90 per cent
have applied for further protection visas, but so far only 350
decisions have been made and 342 were refused.38 A
“freeze” has been placed on Iraqi applications, presumably
until the situation in their homeland improves enough for
them to be returned without an international outcry.
The devalued citizenship status offered to refugees on
TPVs, which has led to continuing discrimination, uncer-
tainty, and powerlessness, was a humiliating experience for
many participants. One young Iranian said: “I feel I’m not
equal or normal person like others here, unusual in this
community. Sometimes I try to hide my identity as a TPV
because I feel ashamed.” But, importantly, many recognized
that they were simply pawns in a political game. For example,
one refugee highlighted the way in which he believed refugees
had been demonized to deny them any claim for justice:
The Minister of Immigration, whenever he comes to the media,
he created bad image or serious type of propaganda against us,
that’s all he did for us. He never mentioned anything about our
suffering and the way that the Iraqi regime, how bad they’ve
been treating the Iraqi people, and our stories, why we are here,
individual or in general … they forgot everything about that.
The next section demonstrates that, alongside assistance
provided by innovative community organizations and sym-
pathetic individuals, this political awareness has enabled
refugees on TPVs to contest the official public discourse
that devalues and demonizes them. Yes, the TPV regime,
which has had such a significant impact on the hearts and
minds of thousands of refugees in Australia, illustrates the
way in which the construction of social identities shapes
people’s capacities for mobility.39 To focus on these nega-
tive experiences alone, however, would tell only part of the
story regarding the integration of refugees on TPVs in
Australian society.
Involved and Empowered: The Effects of an Innovative
Refugee Program
According to Calhoun’s analysis, two other modes of social
belonging sit beside that which develops at the level of
discursive publics. We concentrate first on belonging at the
level of communities, which Calhoun defines in terms of
informal, directly interpersonal relationships, because
these have had an enormous effect on the integration proc-
ess of refugees on TPVs. The refugee participants who spoke
of uncertainty, shame, and powerlessness in the last section
also highlighted how they overcame some of the material
barriers to their resettlement through access to a well-in-
formed community advocate and supportive informal net-
works. For instance, many refugee participants told how
they managed to overcome difficulties obtaining rental
accommodation only with the assistance of an advocate:
So I’d been rejected twenty times by agents and that was very
hard for me. I had no rental history. I was thinking of going back
to Adelaide because I couldn’t stay any longer with my friend
and his children. Then someone from a local migrant group
came with me to the agent and she talked to them, and he was
a Muslim man, so didn’t have the same discrimination as the
others. And that’s how I got my unit, but it’s not in very good
condition.
Many organizations assisting refugees provide the direct
advocacy highlighted here themselves or arrange a commu-
nity “sponsor” to provide advice and practical help in the
first few weeks or months of refugee resettlement. Some of
these formal relationships turn into friendships. But the
artificial and  temporary manner  in  which refugees and
sponsors are matched, along with the pressing needs of
newly arrived refugees, often  result  in such  friendships
being based largely around practical issues, such as finding
and furnishing a house or providing an introduction to the
health and welfare system.
As a consequence, a community-based Neighbourhood
House and adult learning centre in Melbourne called the
Fitzroy Learning Network has attempted to establish more
“natural” settings for friendships to develop, in addition to
the considerable social welfare and material assistance pro-
vided by its paid staff. The Network offers a range of innova-
tive social activities where past and present students,
volunteers, staff, and “friends” of the Network can mingle
informally. The most important of these are: weekly commu-
nity lunches; social events to celebrate important dates, such
as the end of the school term and the arrival of refugees long
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detained on Nauru; regular excursions, including three week-
end-long trips to rural Victoria; and theatrical productions
developed to feature refugees and their survival stories.
A research study involving focus groups with twenty-five
refugees, as well interviews with volunteers and refugee sup-
port workers, indicated that the Network’s activities have
enabled some refugees on TPVs to develop a strong sense of
belonging at the community level.40 Real friendships have
emerged between refugees, as well as between refugees and
Australian citizens. For instance, a small number of the men
are in relationships with Australian women while others have
found an “Australian Mum.” These friendships have been
crucial given that most refugees on TPVs are dislocated from
their biological families and are denied the right to family
reunion. For a refugee on a TPV from Syria, the Network
itself provided a “family” for him:
The Fitzroy Learning Network has changed my life. Here I
found my family, my friends, and my community; here I found
my life …. I like to spend all my time at the Network because I
feel very isolated in my flat. Here I talk to people, practice my
English and ask them for help if I need something like using the
Job Network or other services. Maybe I will never see my real
family again but these people are here for me forever.41
Trust, a quality often difficult for refugees to regain, has
been developed through such relationships. For example,
having shared food and accommodation for several days on
a Network camping holiday, refugees on TPVs – most of
whom travelled to Australia on a leaky boat from Indonesia
– found themselves able to participate in a yachting trip with
the support of friends whom they trusted. Such trust is
mainly at the local level, but is spreading because the rela-
tional networks in which refugees on TPVs have become
embedded are spatially extensive. For instance, a recent week-
end visit to the town of Daylesford saw locals billet the
Network’s refugees. As a result, refugees on TPVs in Mel-
bourne now have friends in regional Victoria. This enhanced
awareness of an alternative public discourse, one gradually
gaining momentum as the thousands of Australians embar-
rassed by their government’s TPV and mandatory detention
regimes begin to speak out, has encouraged a sense of hope
and alleviated some of the shame felt by refugees on TPVs.
In addition, the Network’s activities have enabled refu-
gees on TPVs to forge alliances with sympathetic individu-
als in positions of power, including members of parliament
and policy makers, which are beginning to have important
legal and political repercussions. This is illustrated by a
friendship that developed between a retired Australian
teacher and an Afghan refugee after they met at a Network
social event. The refugee visited each weekend for help with
his English language  study and called frequently to ask
advice on a whole range of everyday matters. In return, he
brought the Australian food and did maintenance jobs
around her house. This friendship soon extended to the
Afghan’s wife, child, and brother, who were detained on the
island of Nauru as part of the Australian Government’s
“Pacific Solution” policy, when the Australian and her
friends began sending letters and parcels.42 More impor-
tantly, the Australian acted as an important middle person
between the refugee, lawyers, and political advisors as they
together fought for nine women and fourteen children on
Nauru to be reunited with their husbands who had been
granted TPVs in Australia. As a result of this collective
effort, the Afghan, his family and several other families
separated by the Pacific Solution have now been reunited
and are living as permanent residents in New Zealand.
In addition to developing social belonging at the commu-
nity level, many refugees on TPVs have also established less
dense and directly interpersonal ties between groups of peo-
ple who share a cultural similarity or legal equivalence. This
sense of belonging at the category level has been facilitated by
several of the Network’s activities. For instance, two theatrical
productions developed to feature refugee survival stories
brought together refugees from a range of backgrounds to
work as a team and acknowledge the experiences they share
as a group. A refugee who took part noted:
I always wanted to tell my story and speak with people but I was
afraid. The play made me face my fears of communicating with
the others and helped me out of my isolation …. We are all
connected through our experiences despite our different back-
grounds.43
In addition, the Network has actively supported refugees
on TPVs in establishing voluntary associations based on
their shared cultural identifies or their legal status. For
instance, organizations representing the Afghan and Iraqi
communities have been established. These include a sepa-
rate Hazara Association which allows Afghans from this
persecuted tribe to have their own voice in Australia, as was
impossible in Afghanistan. Not necessarily reflecting a
strong sense of community amongst refugee groups, such
associations have created space for recognition at the cate-
gory level in order to enter into dialogue with policy makers
and politicians.44 The formation of the Al Amel TPV Hold-
ers Association is a classic example. “Al Amel” means
“hope” in Arabic, a title reflecting the shared desire to cross
cultural, national, and linguistic boundaries to work to-
wards a shared goal: the granting of permanent protection
to all refugees on TPVs. In this role, Al Amel advocates for
change in immigration law, liaises with other groups, and
assists with health, employment, and legal issues.
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In addition to responding to the sense of urgency and
anxiety that surrounds the real threat of deportation for
temporary citizens, such associations based on either cul-
tural or legal categories have provided a vehicle for reclaim-
ing and respecting the cultural and political identities of
refugees. The considerable advocacy work conducted by
refugees on TPVs with the Network’s encouragement has
also achieved this end. Most advocacy has been at the local
level and includes school talks, media interviews, participa-
tion in research that documents the harmful effects of the
TPV regime, and speech-making at pro-refugee rallies.
However, some refugees have also been involved in direct
political lobbying at the state and federal levels. For in-
stance, several of the Network’s refugees stood alongside
employers, regional and rural mayors, and refugee support-
ers to tell their stories and call for a review of the TPV
regime during a delegation to the Federal Parliament in
November 2003. Importantly, the campaign was called
“Refugees say THANK YOU to Australia,” emphasizing
their appreciation that many individuals and communities
had made them feel welcome in the face of extremely un-
welcoming government policy.
Whether at the local, state, or federal level, such activism
has attempted to subvert dominant discursive repre-
sentations by raising awareness about the TPV regime and
countering the rhetoric that suggests that refugees on TPVs
are not valid candidates for permanent citizenship. Given
that public discourses are not static and identities may be
created or changed in public interaction, this challenge to
their representation as “bad” refugees has brought a sense
of belonging to a disparate group of refugees whom gov-
ernment policy has tried to render powerless.45 The findings
in Melbourne thus support Korac’s comparative research,
which highlighted the importance of active agency in suc-
cessful social integration for individual refugees.46
Conclusion
In this paper we have emphasized the importance of decon-
structing conventional notions of integration and belong-
ing to reveal a far more nuanced interpretation of the
“social” than normally acknowledged by refugee resettle-
ment policy and programs. A differentiation between rela-
tional networks, cultural or legal categories, and discursive
publics has assisted in explaining the ambiguous and am-
bivalent resettlement experiences of refugees on TPVs in
Australia. Findings from two qualitative research studies
have offered evidence to suggest that the politics of belong-
ing consist of sets of overlapping and interconnected proc-
esses that take place differently in various sub-sectors and
spheres of receiving societies and have various outcomes.
In this way, it has been possible for refugees on TPVs in
Australia to show strong signs of social integration and
belonging in terms of relational networks and cultural or
legal categories, as well as active resistance to negative rep-
resentations  at  the public level, while at the same time
feeling the material and psychological effects of the divisive
public discourse that demonizes refugees on TPVs.
Social integration is clearly not a singular, stage-sequen-
tial process. There is consequently a need to reassess refugee
policy and programs which tend to be based on such an
assumption. We support Korac’s call for strategies to be
implemented that build the kind of relationships and net-
works which facilitate wider social belonging and integra-
tion.47 We also agree that there needs to be greater
acknowledgment of refugees as social actors, instead of
policy objects or targets. This is particularly the case when
the paper indicates that such a sense of belonging at the
community and category levels is a crucial factor in devel-
oping the trust and empowerment necessary to challenge
the negative representations of asylum seekers that cur-
rently dominate public discourse in Australia.
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